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Introduction
In a secular, multicultural, liberal democratic
society founded on the rule of law,1 is it appropriate for legislators (or political candidates) to
refer to religious beliefs or texts when discussing a government initiative or urging action
on a particular issue? Such references might be
used for various purposes: to explain the speakers’ own beliefs; to emphasize that an issue
has been around for a long time and therefore
should be taken seriously; to elucidate historical
influences on a particular law; or to give weight
to a particular argument by buttressing it with
religious authority. In Canada today, do ethics,
law, or political theory offer persuasive reasons
to limit any such references to religion in parliamentary debate or political campaigning?
In previous articles, we considered the
role of religious-based reasoning in two other
spheres: public discussion2 and judicial decision
making.3 In the first, we argued that there is no
valid reason to dissuade citizens from referring
to their religious beliefs when discussing matters
of public interest. In the second article, we suggested that using religious-based reasoning as a
starting point for judicial analysis is acceptable
where the law is underdetermined,4 and where
care is taken not to violate constitutional protection for freedom of religion, which requires
that the state be neutral as between different
faiths and between believers and nonbelievers.
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We turn now to legislators. We do so not
because we predict any great surge in religious
references and religious-based arguments in
Parliament, provincial or territorial legislatures,
municipal councils, or election campaigning, but
because the issue gives a third angle from which
to consider the relationship between religion
and the public sphere in Canada. Canadian
scholar Benjamin Berger suggests that “[t]here
is perhaps no more important access point into
the key issues of m odern political thought and
legal theory than the questions raised by the
interaction of law and religion in contemporary
constitutional democracies.”5
In our first article in this series we focused
on philosophical arguments about what is or is
not appropriate behaviour for citizens debating
in the public square. In our article on the use of
religious-based reasoning by judges, we looked
primarily at legal arguments regarding freedom
of religion, the role of judges, and the rule of
law. Our primary focus in this third article is
on political theory and, in particular, on different understandings of a constellation of related
concepts: state neutrality, separation of church
and state, and, particularly, secularism.
We start our discussion with a brief overview of the ways in which Canadian politicians
have relied on religious-based reasoning. We
then examine whether ethical considerations,
freedom of religion, or arguments arising from
political theory should preclude Canadian
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legislators or political candidates from making reference to religious beliefs or texts. We
conclude that, so long as freedom of religion
is not infringed, a secular, multicultural, liberal democratic state founded on the rule of law
should provide room for legislators or political
candidates to explain their position on public
issues in terms of their religious beliefs, or with
reference to religious texts or authority, if they
choose to do so.
Of course, this does not mean that such
explanations or references will always be good
political strategy. Very general statements, such
as vague allusions to love, sin, or God’s will may
not be seen as having enough substance to move
the discussion along, while specific faith-based
claims may be seen as unprovable and thus unpersuasive. In fact, explaining one’s political
views in religious terms may simply call forth
incredulity, irritation, or even hostility in others, or may make it more difficult to form alliances with those of another (or no) religious
perspective.
Further, we are not suggesting that recourse
to religious arguments or texts by legislators
will necessarily lead to a better society: religious
reasons (like nonreligious ones) can be used to
support mean-spirited and retrogressive government policies, as well as enlightened and
compassionate ones.6 In our view, however, any
policy should be judged on its own merits, in
other words, on how it will affect individuals,
communities, and different sectors of society,
rather than by whether some of those advocating for or against it refer to religion.
Finally, just as we do not claim that religious references will necessarily advance a particular political cause, or lead to policies that
are good for society, nor do we think that references to religion in political speech will always
be good for religion. Relying on religious reasons to buttress draconian or ungenerous policies may confirm for some that all religions (or
the particular religion being relied upon in that
case) are hypocritical in their talk of compassion and justice. Hearing politicians on both
sides of a debate claim that their position is biblically based may lead some to conclude that religious reasoning is silly or chaotic, or may call
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to mind Shakespeare’s comment that even the
Devil can cite scripture to his purpose.7 American scholar Stephen Carter—who has roundly
criticized efforts to excise “God-talk” from the
public square—warns that constantly invoking
religion in political debate may cause “God’s
name [to] become a tool, a trope, a ticket to get
us where we want to go.”8
So we are not asking whether religiousbased arguments or references will necessarily
further a particular policy objective or politician’s career, lead to better governance, or enhance society’s view of religion; we are simply
asking whether there is room for such arguments and references in a secular, multicultural,
liberal democratic society such as Canada. Or,
to put it another way: are the core principles of
democracy, as understood in Canada, violated
by legislators making religious-based arguments and references?

Political References to Religion
Religious references by politicians in the
United States are not unusual.9 To give two
recent examples, President Barack Obama has
buttressed his call for higher taxes for the rich
by reference to Luke 12:48,10 while Republican
Rick Santorum has alleged that Obama’s
policies are not biblically based.11 In Canada,
however, it is fairly rare for politicians to
support their positions on social or economic
policy by reference to their religious beliefs or
by calling on religious authority. This may, of
course, simply reflect different political realities
in the two countries. Thus, according to political
scientist Katherine Fierlbeck,
Only 30 per cent of Canadians consider themselves to be devout, so policy-makers heed their
political constituencies rather than religious
authorities when legislating new laws and
programs. This secularism makes Canada distinct from the United States; over two-thirds
of Americans consider themselves to be regular church-goers, and American politicians are
very mindful of religious lobby groups.12

That said, other researchers report significant
levels of “religiosity” in Canada,13 and certainly
religious-based organizations and coalitions
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have lobbied government on a variety of
issues over the years. Whatever the degree of
religious adherence or affiliation in Canada,
however, it does appear that overt references
to religion by individual politicians or overt
reliance on religion by political parties is fairly
rare in Canada. The Social Credit Party and
the Canadian Co-operative Federation (CCF)
are often seen as “good examples of 20th
century religious-political movements.”14 Today,
however, the Social Credit Party has little or
no impact on politics. As for the CCF, even the
early connections to religion may be somewhat
more nuanced than sometimes assumed: J. S.
Woodsworth ultimately came to believe that
the formal religious institutions to which he
belonged were at odds with his political goals,15
and Tommy Douglas remarked that the Bible
was like a fiddle that could play whatever tune
the fiddler wanted.16 Certainly, today the New
Democratic Party (NDP), the successor to the
CCF, has “shed most of its Christian identity.”17
In fact, one commentator suggests that “[i]t is
more likely that political influence has had a
larger impact on the doctrine of the United
Church than religious doctrine has shaped the
New Democratic Party.”18
While contemporary Canadian politicians
do not frequently make arguments based on
religious belief, or turn to religious authority
to give weight to their position, it is possible to
find a few such examples. For instance, in a sermon, Elizabeth May, who is both the leader of
the federal Green Party and an Anglican priest
in training, connected her environmentalist
concerns to her religious beliefs.19 A number
of parliamentarians have expressed their religiously based opposition to embryonic stem cell
research, referring, variously, to the belief that
ensoulment occurs at the moment of conception,20 to Jesus’ teachings on the need to protect
children,21 and to “the very principles of natural law [which] existed before government and
. . . [which] are based on the law of nature and
nature’s God.”22 Other examples include references to injunctions against usury in the Bible
and the Quran in a discussion on credit card
interest;23 an allusion to Deuteronomy 24:10 in
a list of arguments for greater privacy in one’s
home;24 reference to the biblical concept of Jubi-
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lee to advocate forgiving debts owed by poorer
nations;25 reliance on the Bible and the Quran
in support of amending the Criminal Code to
create a specific offence for suicide bombings;26
and a request to reinstate the Lord’s Prayer in
the House of Commons.27
The paucity of overt references to religion
by Canadian legislators does not, of course,
mean that no Canadian politicians are religious; on occasion, members of the clergy have
been elected to government and some other legislators have held strong religious beliefs as well.
For instance, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
was a committed Roman Catholic and one
analysis of his “universalist liberalism” devotes
significant discussion to “the spiritual sources
of Trudeau’s political philosophy.”28 However,
Trudeau rarely made the connection between
his political views and his religion explicit, at
least in public. Like Trudeau, most Canadian
politicians of faith have kept that faith a private
matter. This suggests that there is a strong social
norm against express reliance by legislators on
religious-based reasoning. According to Claude
Ryan, “There has been a tendency since World
War II to relegate religion to the private sphere;
to suggest that it should have as little as possible
to do with economic, social and political life.”29
In the remainder of this paper, we evaluate the arguments that are frequently invoked
in support of upholding or even strengthening
this norm—arguments based on ethical considerations, the Charter, and political theory. We
conclude that concerns about civility and inclusiveness, the Constitution, or the secular nature
of Canada do not justify attempting to place an
embargo on legislators referencing religion.

Ethical Considerations: Civility and
Inclusiveness
Can an ethical argument against the use of religious references by legislators be constructed,
based on civility and inclusiveness? Arguably,
one of the core elements of “liberal-democratic
morality” is “freedom[] of political communication.”30 If so, careful thought should be given
to whether particular ways of communicating
about important political and social issues im-
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pede others (particularly those who have been
historically marginalized) from entering into
the discussion. Would religious references by
politicians so ostracize those who do not share
their religious views that reliance on such references could be seen as unethical or offending
liberal-democratic morality?
In a state where a vast majority of citizens
are at least nominally of one religion, one might
assume that most religious references will relate to that religion. Thus, in Canada, where
three-quarters of Canadians self-identify as
Christian,31 it is possible that most religious
reasoning would be based on the Bible and particularly, perhaps, the New Testament, or on
Christian perspectives on the Bible. Could it be
argued that anyone not familiar with both Old
and New Testaments and with Christian tradition would have to become familiar in order
to enter the debate? If so, could this be seen as
inappropriate and unwelcoming in a multicultural, secular society?
We offer three responses: first, it is important to answer questions such as this in context,
rather than as hypotheticals; second, an understanding of civility as avoiding all possibility of
disagreement would weaken public and political debate; and finally, inclusiveness actually demands that politicians feel free to refer to their
comprehensive values, whether religious or not.
Looking first at context, then: the concern
that religious-based reasoning could work to
exclude those of another, or no, religion would
be more pressing if all citizens of the dominant
religion were both so devout and so theologically
knowledgeable that religious-based reasoning
was in wide usage, or if law and religion were
so closely intertwined that it would be hard to
understand the law without understanding the
dominant faith. We could imagine a society
where the inability to quote passages from
a particular religious text might leave one
completely outside mainstream political debate
or unable to understand the law. That is not the
situation in Canada, however. If an argument
from religion strikes listeners in Canada today
as incomprehensible, it is the speaker, not the
listener, who is likely to be sidelined.32 Further,
if the concern is that mainstream Christians
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would benefit most from a political atmosphere
that is open to religious references, this is not
necessarily the case. While more Canadians
consider themselves as affiliated with a Christian
denomination than any other religion, it does
not necessarily follow that political references to
religion would be overwhelmingly mainstream
Christian. It seems possible that there are
other communities in Canada—for instance,
although not limited to, those who have
recently immigrated—where religion may play
a more significant role in one’s sense of identity.
Individuals from these communities might feel
a greater need to express their concerns and
priorities in religious terms. If so, a norm that
frowns on the use of religious-based reasoning
by legislators is far from inclusive; it may, albeit
unintentionally, discourage some Canadians,
including some newer Canadians, from entering
politics.
Secondly, while civility—treating others’
views with respect—is of utmost importance, it
should not be watered down to mean avoidance
of disagreement or diverse views. Divisiveness
alone is not a valid criterion for excluding ideas
from political speech. Presumably, we want to
foster a vigorous debate on matters of public
significance. As John Young argues,
To suggest that religion ought not to be part
of public discussion and debate or influence
public policy is to diminish democracy—not
because the Bible or the Koran are superior
political texts, but because democracy is, at its
core, a debate.33

The mere fact that an idea may be unconventional, startling, unpopular, or countercultural
is no reason to muzzle the expression of such
an idea. Religious-based reasoning by legislators, even if it falls oddly on some ears, may add
richness and new and helpful perspectives; and
frankly, even if it does not, it is still a valid form
of expression. Further, debate that is not only
vigorous but reveals why a person feels the way
they do is more transparent and may allow for
a more focussed examination and perhaps, ultimately, rebuttal of certain ideas.34
This leads to our third point: politicians
of faith should not be precluded from arguing
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from their deepest convictions when there is no
such restriction on others who wish to speak
from deeply held positions. Thus, if a Canadian
politician shared the view of American philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff that he personally
can find no way of justifying why individuals
and society should be concerned about alleviating poverty without turning to the Bible,35 surely it should be open to that politician to explain
the religious foundation for his or her commitment to social justice, just as it would be open to
some other politician to express similar views
based on deeply held humanist principles.

dom of religion, which also protects freedom
from religion,36 be violated by a legislator’s reliance on religious-based reasoning? Section 2(a)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees everyone the right to freedom of
conscience and religion. As with all the rights
and freedoms in the Charter, s. 2(a) places limits
on the power of the state: the state is expected to
be neutral as between religions and as between
religious belief and unbelief.37 Further, s. 1 provides that such freedom is subject only to such
limitations as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.38

Of course, the corollary of legislators using
religious-based arguments is that the argument
and the underlying faith claim are then as legitimately open to critique, rebuttal, and satire
as arguments offered from other perspectives.
In other words, arguments based on religion—
like any other expression of belief, conscience,
or opinion—can hope to be treated with respect, but cannot expect to be treated as sacred
in public debate. Such debate may at times be
divisive (although other times may perhaps allow for greater understanding or even reconciliation); however, wherever people hold strong
conflicting views on important issues, there is
the potential for discord. This would be the case
whether or not explicitly religious-based arguments are made. Thus, to use an American example, in the last presidential election, Democrats and Republicans were significantly at odds
over whether the rich should be taxed more rigorously, and at least some politicians expressed
this disagreement with rancour and personal
attack, whether or not religion was referenced.

Freedom of religion encompasses several core
concepts:

Arguably,
then,
excising
religious
references from politics is unlikely to create an
atmosphere of harmony and accord. Further,
only very watered-down notions of civility
and inclusiveness, which might well result
in watered-down public debate, could justify
limiting politicians’ ability to explain their
positions in religious terms, should they wish to
do so.

Freedom of Religion
Would the constitutional protection for free-
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Freedom of religion consists first of all in the
right to make up one’s own mind when answering religious questions. These include, but
are not limited to, such questions as whether
God exists, how God should be conceived, and
what responsibilities, if any, human beings
have in response to God’s actions with regard
to them. Freedom of religion also consists in
the right to act in ways that seem appropriate,
given one’s answers to religious questions—
provided that one does not cause harm to other people or interfere with their rights.39

A law might prove to be unconstitutional for its
violation of these rights in two ways. First, legislation that has a religious purpose is unconstitutional—it infringes freedom of religion and
cannot be saved by s. 1 of the Charter. Secondly,
even where legislation is passed for a secular
purpose, its impact may violate freedom of religion and this, too, is unconstitutional, unless
the disproportionate impact can be justified under s. 1. We argue that reference to religious reasoning by politicians does not, by itself, offend
the Constitution in either respect.
Whether a law has an objectively religious
purpose is discerned primarily from the language of the act, including the act’s purpose
section (if it has one), as well as from statements
made by the government on a bill’s introduction, and from the purpose ascribed by earlier
courts to similar legislation. Thus, in R. v. Big
M Drug Mart,40 the Supreme Court of Canada
concluded that the Lord’s Day Act41 (which required Sunday closing of businesses) had a reli-
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gious purpose. The Court reached this conclusion by considering precursors to the legislation
that contained overtly religious statements, and
earlier decisions of the Privy Council and Supreme Court of Canada to the effect that the
chief purpose of the legislation was to enforce
observance of a Christian Sabbath and “provide
for the peace and order of the public on the Lord’s
Day.”42 According to Dickson J.:
In proclaiming the standards of the Christian faith, the Act creates a climate hostile to,
and gives the appearance of discrimination
against, nonChristian Canadians. It takes religious values rooted in Christian morality and,
using the force of the state, translates them
into a positive law binding on believers and
nonbelievers alike. The theological content of
the legislation remains as a subtle and constant
reminder to religious minorities within the
country of their differences with, and alienation from, the dominant religious culture.43

Once the Court in Big M concluded that the
paramount purpose of the Lord’s Day Act was
religious, that settled the constitutional question. The purpose of the Act violated freedom
of religion and so the legislation could not be
saved by s. 1.
The mere fact that legislators might offer
faith-based justifications in support of a bill, or
that legislation might cohere with the teachings
of some religions does not, however, approach
the threshold of an unconstitutionally impermissible religious purpose. Big M sets a high
bar for finding that a law has a religious purpose
such that it automatically offends the Constitution. This is appropriate, given that no recourse
to s. 1 is available once the Big M test has been
met. The “religious purpose” test will strike
down laws that are so clearly infused with religious purpose that there is no need to consider
their impact, and no justification is possible.
Violations of freedom of religion on this
first basis will be relatively rare in Canada
and should not be found lightly. It would be a
misunderstanding of the purpose of freedom
of religion for a court to strike down a law as
unconstitutional simply because the law coincides with the religious convictions of some
politicians. This is particularly true since the
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religious purpose test is not the only protection offered by s. 2(a); courts have a second and
more substantial basis on which to determine
the constitutionality of a law, namely its impact.
According to the Supreme Court of Canada
in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,44 a law
whose purpose is secular may still be found
to violate freedom of religion if its impact is
not neutral as between religions or as between
religion and nonreligion. If there is a prima facie
violation of s. 2, then a s. 1 analysis is required.
On the surface, Edwards Books looked similar
to Big M as it, too, dealt with Sunday closing
legislation; here, however, it was the Court’s s. 1
analysis that proved decisive. In Edwards Books,
the Court concluded that the Retail Business
Holidays Act,45 unlike the Lord’s Day Act, was
enacted for the secular purpose of providing a
common day of rest for workers, rather than as
a “surreptitious attempt to encourage religious
worship.” 46
The disproportionate impact on those
whose religion observed a day of rest other
than Sunday was an effect of the legislation, but
not its purpose. Therefore, a s. 1 analysis could
be conducted. In that case, the legislation was
upheld.
An example may help to illustrate that use
of religious-based reasoning by legislators is not
enough, by itself, to infringe freedom of religion.
Suppose a bill was introduced in Parliament to
reintroduce the death penalty for first-degree
murder. On the first basis for unconstitutionality—a religious purpose – the bill would indeed
be unconstitutional if it were introduced by the
Minister of Justice as codifying the sixth commandment or if this formed the purpose section of the bill. Assume instead, however, that
the bill is introduced as part of the government’s
“get tough on crime” stance, and justified by the
Minister of Justice as providing greater general and specific deterrence and protecting the
public. It would be quite possible for individual
politicians to construct biblical arguments for
the bill, for instance arguing that the deliberate breaking of the commandment “Thou shalt
not kill” 47 requires the most extreme penalty.
These arguments would not, however, affect the
purpose of the bill. Based on the approach takVolume 21, Number 2, 2012

en in Big M and Edwards Books, it is extremely
unlikely that a statement of religious conviction
by one or more politicians in parliamentary
debate would be sufficient to show that the law
had a religious purpose or was a “surreptitious
attempt to encourage religious worship.” Nor
would it have the effect of imposing Abrahamic
law on nonbelievers or create a climate hostile
to nonbelievers. The secular nature of the bill
would not be undermined simply because some
individual MPs based their support of it on
their religious beliefs. If the bill became law, it
could not be challenged as having a religious—
and therefore unconstitutional—purpose.
Therefore, to continue with our example, reinstatement of the death penalty could be challenged on freedom of religion grounds only by
showing that it had the effect of infringing freedom of religion. For this second potential basis
of unconstitutionality, the presence or absence
of religious reasoning by legislators would be
completely irrelevant. A challenge based on disparate impact would involve showing that reinstating the death penalty, although not directed
at religious belief or practice, in fact prevented
religious individuals from practicing their religion or imposed particular religious beliefs
and practices on individuals. Such an argument
might be made out if a prison official or other
state employee objected on religious grounds to
being compelled to assist with an execution. The
success of such a challenge would have nothing
to do, however, with whether religious or only
secular justifications had been offered by individual MPs during passage of the bill.
Thus, while constitutional parameters
guard against legislation or government policy
that has a religious purpose or that inadvertently infringes religious freedom (unless the
infringement can be justified under s. 1 of the
Charter), use of religious-based reasoning by
legislators is not inherently unconstitutional.

Secularism and Related Concepts
Assuming that the constitutional limits established by s. 2(a) of the Charter are adhered to,
arguments against religious references by politicians flow less from the law and more from
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several related strands of political theory—most
particularly from concepts of state neutrality,
separation of church and state, and, above all,
secularism. Each of these is a contested term,
and we argue that only the most extreme interpretation of each—interpretations not in keeping with Canadian tradition—requires that religion be kept entirely out of public and political
life.

Neutrality
As noted above, the freedom of religion guarantee in s. 2(a) of the Charter has been interpreted as requiring that the state remain neutral
as between religions and between religion and
nonreligion. Not surprisingly, however, there
are different notions as to how this neutrality
is to be achieved—beyond the obvious constitutional parameters discussed above that preclude
the state from legislating for a religious purpose
and require the state to provide justifications
for legislation that has a disproportionate effect vis-à-vis religion. In the Supreme Court of
Canada’s most recent decision involving freedom of religion, S.L. v. Commission scholaire
des Chênes, Justice Deschamps, writing for the
majority, states that “[r]eligious neutrality is
now seen by many Western states as a legitimate
means of creating a free space in which citizens
of various beliefs can exercise their individual
rights.”48 It is unclear, however, (and unnecessary to clarify for the purposes of that decision) whether the public space becomes “free”
in this way by discouraging or encouraging a
full discussion of the various beliefs held by
citizens. In their report on interculturalism in
Quebec, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation,49 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor refer to the “ambiguity of state neutrality.”50
They state that “it is widely acknowledged that
the secular State must be neutral in respect of
all religions. To this we must add that the State
must not take sides as regards religion and nonreligion.”51 However, Bouchard and Taylor note
that this neutrality may be expressed in different “institutional structures.”52 They describe
two possible structures: a complete separation
of church and state and “the neutrality of the
State with respect to religions and deep-seated
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secular convictions.”53 They conclude that “[s]
ince freedom of conscience and religion is one
of the purposes of secularism . . . the neutrality
of the State . . . should be designed to foster, not
hinder, its expression.”54 We would agree with
their conclusion that neutrality is best achieved
where free expression of matters of importance
to individuals and communities, including matters relating to religious belief and conscience, is
allowed to flourish.

Separation of Church and State
A core legacy of the Enlightenment is the idea
that the church and state are not—and should
not be—one. While this principle would be
seen by most as a fundamental characteristic of
modern Western democratic states, there are,
however, a variety of ways in which this principle can be understood.
The formal separation of church and state
is a key constitutional principle in the United
States and has had a significant influence on
how American courts have interpreted the
clauses relating to religion in the US Constitution. In Canada, however, the status of separation of church and state arguments is less clear.
Certainly, the Enlightenment legacy is evident
in that there is no tradition in Canada of a theocratic state intended to be ruled by god, where
religious authorities are formally recognized as
having the power to dictate law and policies.
Further, Canada has no formal policy of requiring an individual to belong to a particular faith
in order to run for government or hold public
office. Finally, unlike England, Canada has no
tradition of an established church. In fact, given
s. 2(a) of the Charter, attempts to inaugurate a
theocracy, to require public officials to belong
to a particular (or any) religion, or to create an
established church would clearly be unconstitutional. Beyond our political traditions and the
requirements of s. 2(a) of the Charter, however,
there is no exact sense of what further, if anything, separation of church and state demands.
The phrase is rarely used in Canadian jurisprudence, and one historian has characterized the relationship between church and state
in Canada as “ill-defined—and difficult to
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define.”55 The most recent reference by the Supreme Court of Canada56 simply makes a general link between this separation and secularization in the West—which tells us little about how
either separation or secularization is to be conceived of in Canada. In a speech comparing the
protection of constitutional rights in the United
States and Canada, Chief Justice McLachlin has
said:
The United States constitution enunciates a
doctrine of separation of church and state
which precludes the state from supporting any
religion. The Canadian guarantee protects the
right of the individual to practice the religion
of his or her choice, but also permits the state
to support religious groups—indeed it requires
the state to support minority Roman Catholic
and Protestant school systems in some provinces as a consequence of the concern of the fathers of Confederation that minority religious
rights be protected. 57

According to the Chief Justice, then, protection
of freedom of religion is the Canadian parallel
to American concepts of separation of church
and state.
European scholar Veit Bader suggests that
understanding separation of church and state to
mean a complete privatization of religious belief
and practice is a “counterfactual and maximalist interpretation”58 of the phrase. He argues
instead that only a “minimal threshold of institutional, organizational and role differentiation between religious and other organizations
(specifically the state) is functionally required
for modern societies.”59 This threshold can best
be described as protection of reciprocal “autonomies,”60 where religious organizations cannot
control the state and the state cannot control
the inner workings of religious organizations.
Canadian scholar Iain T. Benson offers a similar picture:
Though the secular overlaps with the religious,
the secular state does not have jurisdiction
over the religions, just as the religions, though
they are active in the public sphere, do not
have jurisdiction over the state.61

We would agree with Bader that “liberaldemocratic constitutions do not or should
not require a strict wall of separation between
Volume 21, Number 2, 2012

‘secular’ state politics and religions”62 and
therefore references to the separation of church
and state are not sufficient to preclude religiousbased reasoning by legislators. This conclusion
is buttressed by the fact that religious references
by politicians abound in the United States,
which does view the separation of church and
state as an integral constitutional principle.

Secular
Often closely allied with concepts of state neutrality and separation of church and state, the
characterization of modern democratic states
as secular is frequently the chief argument offered for keeping religion out of public and political discourse. The first recorded use of the
term “secular,” in the thirteenth century, meant
“living in the world, not belonging to a religious
order”; thus, a priest who lived outside a monastery, attending to the needs of the world, was a
secular priest.63 The word also had connotations
“of an age,”64 thus allowing secularity to be contrasted to the eternal nature of God. A currentday definition of secular incorporates a number
of these elements, including “not ecclesiastical
or clerical,” “not bound by monastic vows,” and
“worldly or temporal”; further, the definition
specifies “not overtly or specifically religious.”65
There are a number of references in the jurisprudence to Canada as a secular state. Thus,
in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), Lamer C.J.C., in dissent (although probably
not on this point) stated that “the Charter has established the essentially secular nature of Canadian society.”66 The reference to the supremacy of
God in the preamble to the Charter has not been
recognized by courts as creating rights or providing an interpretative lens for understanding
the rest of the Charter.67 In its most recent decision on freedom of religion, the Supreme Court
of Canada noted that “[t]he gradual separation
of church and state in Canada has been part of
a broad movement to secularize public institutions in the Western world.”68 However, even if
it is generally accepted that Canada is a secular
state, there is no one accepted definition of “secular” in Canada. Without further elaboration, this
label gives little guidance as to exactly what role
religion may play in public life.
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel

For some, the term “secular” is a synonym
for complete separation of church and state; on
this understanding, it means “the removal of
religion from public life,”69 with the concomitant privatization of religion as merely something one may or may not decide to engage in
at home or in the church, synagogue, mosque,
or temple. This approach may be based simply
on the desire to avoid the kinds of conflict that
can arise out of differing religious views,70 but
more frequently it seems to reflect a view of
religion as an unfortunate holdover from the
past. Thus, John Von Heyking describes the
“secularization thesis” as based on the premise
“that societies evolve (or progress) from being
religion-centred to being centred on secular, especially scientific knowledge, and human forms
of governance.”71Another definition of the secularization thesis refers to “historical processes
of rationalization that would ultimately spell
the end of religion as a publically significant
cultural phenomenon.”72
Even as simply a descriptive, rather than
normative, theory, the secularization thesis
seems doubtful. It may be somewhat credible
in Western Europe—although even there, not
fully—and it certainly does not seem to reflect
experiences in North America or elsewhere. As
Veit Bader, writing from a European perspective, states:
The thesis that religious beliefs and practices
would inevitably decline, based on evidence in
Western Europe, clearly does not hold for the
US and the ‘rest of the world’. The thesis that
all religious concerns and worries will only be
limited to and pertain to the private realm is
contradicted by their recent widespread presence in the public realm. Currently, conservative and fundamentalist religions as well as
progressive religions are re-politicising ‘private’ relations and re-normativising the economic and political spheres.73

In Canada, according to the 2001 census (the
most recent date for which census information
on religious affiliation is available), one-sixth
of Canadians reported having no religious affiliation.74 While one could debate exactly what
degree of belief or practice is implied by affiliation, when five-sixths of Canadians see religion
as playing some role in their lives, it is hard to
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argue that the secularization thesis offers an accurate account of Canadian society.
Arguably, then, we should be seeking an
understanding of secularism that more fully reflects the Canadian experience, and the Canadian commitment to multiculturalism. Secularism need not be understood solely in opposition
to religion. Another possible definition—which
parallels the understanding that separation of
church and state simply requires the protection
of reciprocal autonomies—is that a “[secular]
state must not be run or directed by a particular religion or ‘faith-group’ but must develop a
notion of moral citizenship consistent with the
widest involvement of different faith groups
(religious and non-religious).”75 This is in keeping with a Canadian case that distinguished
between a secular state and an “atheistic” one,
describing a secular state as one that simply
“leaves religion alone,”76 rather than, presumably, one that attempts to oust it from the public
sphere.
In his recent work, A Secular Age,77 Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor offers three understandings of the term “secular.” The first two
possibilities are “secularized public spaces” and
“the decline of belief or practice,” both of which
Taylor rejects as unhelpful. Instead, he suggests
that secularism represents
a change . . . which takes us from a society in
which it is virtually impossible not to believe
in God, to one in which faith, for even the
staunchest believer, is one human possibility
among others. . . . Belief in God is no longer
automatic. There are alternatives.78

From this perspective, secularization is neither
about the need to banish religion from public
life, nor about the growing irrelevance of religion. Instead, it describes a state of mind alive
to the different possibilities that exist, once one
discards old and hegemonic assumptions.
American scholar Jeffrey Stout would agree.
He argues that the secularization of modern democracies does not “rule[] out an expression of
religious premises or the entitlement of individuals to accept religious assumptions.”79 Instead,
for Stout, the core aspect of this secularization
is that speakers from within the dominant reli-
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gious traditions—or indeed any religious tradition—cannot and should not assume that others will share their perspective:
[S]ecularization concerns what can be taken
for granted when exchanging reasons in public
settings. . . . What makes a form of discourse
secularized is not the tendency of the people
participating in it to relinquish their religious
beliefs or to refrain from employing them
as reasons. The mark of secularization . . . is
rather the fact that participants in a given discursive practice are not in a position to take
for granted that their interlocutors are making
the same religious assumptions that they are.
This is the sense in which public discourse in
modern democracies tends to be secularized.80

This seems to us a far more nuanced and inclusive understanding of the secular, to be preferred over definitions that view religion as the
enemy of a secular state. The recognition that
one cannot simply take for granted the perspective of others also seems to go some way towards
answering the concerns regarding incivility and
exclusion raised earlier.
Further, not only is this enhanced understanding of secular more inclusive but it is also
more accurate. As Iain T. Benson has argued,
it is simply inaccurate to view faith and secularism as separate and opposed concepts. As we
noted in our earlier paper on religious discourse
in the public square, all comprehensive world
views are based on core concepts that require
a leap of faith. As Benson explains, “faith—understood as metaphysical assertions that we do
not empirically prove” is “an inevitable aspect
of human action and therefore of culture.”81
Therefore, it is impossible to expect legislators
to refrain from making faith-based statements.
All politicians will make such statements from
time to time, although some will do so from
a religious perspective and others will call on
other foundational values. The politician who
speaks about the importance of fostering dignity and equality for all is making a faith-based
statement. The politician who posits that some
species of a regulated free market provides the
greatest scope for human flourishing is making
a faith-based statement. This is so, even where
there is no reference to, or reliance on, religion.
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The question, therefore, seems to be: out of
all the different kinds of faith-based statements
that might be made by legislators, is there a valid reason for excluding those that flow from a
religious world view? Does recognition of Canada as a secular state automatically require such
a norm? While recognizing that legislation or
government policies cannot have as their purpose favouring one religion over another or
favouring religion over nonreligion, it is hard
to see why legislators discussing public policy
should be allowed to make some kinds of faithbased statements but not others.
In Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No.
36,82 the Supreme Court of Canada was required
to interpret a provision in the British Columbia
School Act83 to the effect that “[a]ll schools and
Provincial schools must be conducted on strictly secular and non-sectarian principles.”84 Chief
Justice McLachlin stated:
The Act’s insistence on strict secularism does
not mean that religious concerns have no
place in the deliberations and decisions of the
Board. Board members are entitled, and indeed required, to bring the views of the parents and communities they represent to the
deliberation process. Because religion plays
an important role in the life of many communities, these views will often be motivated
by religious concerns. Religion is an integral
aspect of people’s lives, and cannot be left at
the boardroom door. What secularism does
rule out, however, is any attempt to use the religious views of one part of the community to
exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community. A requirement of
secularism implies that, although the Board is
indeed free to address the religious concerns
of parents, it must be sure to do so in a manner that gives equal recognition and respect to
other members of the community.85

This approach suggests that, in Canada, secularism aligns with the constitutional protection
for freedom of religion. Or, to put it another
way, when legislators act in accordance with s.
2(a) of the Charter, they are exhibiting respect
for secularism, whether their arguments for or
against particular public policy initiatives are
explained in religious or nonreligious terms.
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Conclusion
Having looked at arguments based on ethical
concerns for civility and inclusiveness, at constitutional arguments based on freedom of religion, and at different understandings of secularism and related concepts, we conclude that
there is no good reason to frown on religiousbased references by legislators in a secular, multicultural, liberal democratic society founded
on the rule of law. In saying this, we are not suggesting that arguments based on religious beliefs or texts will always be good political strategy, will lead to better laws, or will enhance the
public perception of religion. However, to label
such arguments as un-Canadian or undemocratic may limit public debate, both in terms of
the ideas that are advanced and who engages in
the debate. Further, it would unfairly privilege
faith-based claims founded on nonreligious
world views over faith-based claims founded on
religious perspectives.
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